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Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, ethnic minorities have been increasingly represented within the 
executive ranks at US firms. In 1979, just 0.05 percent of executives at Fortune 1000 firms 
were of an ethnic minority background (Jones 1986). By 2010, we estimate that of 2,682 
executives at S&P 1500 firms, 6.8 percent are ethnic minorities. These executives represent an 
important and interesting group, race and ethnicity being important personal attributes that may 
impact executives’ treatment and behavior. In this paper we empirically examine the 
compensation outcomes for these executives. 
 Such evidence is important since it may shed light on whether minority executives suffer 
discrimination, which is an issue of significant social, economic and political importance 
(Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 1995). Minority executives could be disadvantaged by 
prejudice, statistical discrimination, or race based stereotyping, leading to lower compensation. 
There is anecdotal evidence of perceived racial discrimination in executive pay, such as the 
following quote from an African American executive: 
“I’m experiencing that right now. They bring in a new CFO.... even though I’ve been 
running things. They pay him twice as much as me and I’ve been there 10 years. I see the 
salary differences between Blacks and Whites.” (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 
1995, p. 70) 
The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission (1995) concluded that pay discrimination is 
widespread, noting that where minorities, “are in top positions, they are not being rewarded 
equally” (1995, p. 80).  
We contribute to the labor economics literature on racial pay differences, executive pay 
studies on gender, and a small number of studies that examine ethnic minority executives 
(Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2011; Park and Westphal 2013; Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun 2015; 
Guest 2015). Discrimination may also take place through mobility, and Guest (2015) shows 
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that whilst ethnic minority executives as a whole face similar mobility patterns to Caucasians, 
African Americans face a lower likelihood of promotion and higher likelihood of demotion and 
exit. The only executive pay study on ethnic minorities is Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun (2015) 
who find ethnic minority CEOs earn higher pay than Caucasians.1 We examine a much larger 
sample that includes other executive officers for whom discrimination is more relevant 
(Newton and Simutin 2015), and consider individual ethnic groups. 
Whilst discrimination is a key hypothesis, a limitation of our approach is that compensation 
differences are not direct tests of discrimination and may be caused by executive characteristics 
such as ability, effort and risk preferences. Such characteristics may be unobservable and may 
differ by ethnicity, since ethnic minority executives are unlikely to be a random sample that 
differ from Caucasians in terms of ethnicity alone. Whilst such differences arguably diminish 
as one moves up the corporate hierarchy (Bertrand and Hallock 2001), they could still be 
significant and account for any observed differences in pay.  
Our key findings are as follows: The total pay of African American executives is 9 percent 
lower than that earned by Caucasians. This is due to lower salary, bonus, and stock grants.  
African Americans also earn less on option exercise, increasing the pay gap to 17 percent for 
total ex-post pay. The lower bonus is due to a lower sensitivity to above average firm 
performance. If the lower compensation were the result of discrimination, it could diminish 
with ethnic minority presence in pay setter positions. However, we find no such evidence. In 
contrast to African Americans, the compensation of Hispanic and Asian executives is 
comparable to Caucasians. 
                                                          
 
1 At the CEO level there are anecdotal examples of ethnic minorities receiving controversially high 
compensation such as Derek Raines (Fannie Mae) (Bebchuk and Fried 2005), along with Vikram Pandit 
(Citigroup) and Fernando Aguirre (Chiquita Brands) both of whom had their pay packages voted down by 
shareholders in 2011. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses related literature; the data section 
describes the data; the empirical results section presents the findings; the final section 
concludes.  
Related Literature  
Theoretical Literature on Executive Compensation and Discrimination  
Boards, and in particular compensation committees, set the pay levels and structures of 
executives. The CEO however plays a key role in the compensation of other executives, 
assessing their performance and making a pay recommendation to the committee (Newton and 
Simutin 2015). Therefore the key decision maker is different for the CEO (compensation 
committee) and other executives (CEO in conjunction with the compensation committee). This 
distinction is relevant to the subsequent discussion and empirical tests.  
Principal agent theory shows how executive pay is optimally set given executive ability, 
effort, and risk preference (Murphy 1999). In contrast, the managerial power theory posits that 
powerful CEOs capture outside directors on the compensation committee and consequently 
earn inefficiently high pay (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Within either framework, discrimination 
may operate against ethnic minority CEOs and lower executives resulting in lower pay. 
MacLeod (2003) shows, within a principal agent framework, how introducing subjective 
evaluation can result in discrimination and a second best solution. Within a managerial power 
framework, ethnic minority CEOs may find it harder to capture compensation committees if 
the latter are discriminatory, resulting in less excessive (but more efficient) pay. Theories in 
economics and social psychology show why the compensation committee (to the extent it is 
predominantly Caucasian) may discriminate against ethnic minority CEOs, and why a 
Caucasian CEO may discriminate against ethnic minority executives.  
Economic theories are based on either prejudice (Becker 1971) or statistical discrimination 
(Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973). Compensation committee members may be prejudiced and have a 
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taste based preference to minimize interaction with minority executives, subsequently 
awarding them lower pay. Alternatively, committee members may face asymmetric 
information about executive ability and use their perceptions about average minority group 
ability (correctly or incorrectly held) to statistically discriminate on pay. If there is no perceived 
difference in mean ability but the variance of ability or the variance in the signal of ability is 
higher, then risk averse committee members may award minority executives lower 
compensation. The latter scenario appears plausible for ethnic minority executives, for whom 
only a relatively small number are observable. This differential reliability may result in the 
committee placing less weight on observed performance outcomes associated with minority 
executives, thus reducing their pay performance sensitivity. 
Studies in social psychology show that business leaders are perceived to exhibit traits that 
are more correlated with those of Caucasians than ethnic minorities (Chung-Herrera and 
Lankau 2005; Rosette et al. 2008).  Such stereotyping may result in ethnic minority executives 
being perceived as lacking leadership traits, resulting in lower pay and pay performance 
sensitivity due to a perception of them having less influence on performance (Kulich et al. 
2011). Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) posits that individuals with similar 
characteristics, such as ethnicity, will form ‘in-groups’ and treat individuals in ‘out-groups’ 
less favorably. This could result in minority executives earning lower pay, and subjected to 
attribution bias, whereby the compensation committee attributes positive (negative) outcomes 
more (less) strongly to executive actions by Caucasian executives.  
Empirical Literature on Compensation and Discrimination 
The labor economics empirical literature on racial pay differences shows that African 
Americans and Hispanics (although not Asians) earn less than Caucasians (Lang and Lehman 
2012). As earnings levels increase, this gap declines. However, for jobs with pay for 
performance, it exists at high seniority levels (Heywood and Parent 2012), the discretionary 
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nature of performance pay possibly causing discrimination. The only study that examines 
executive pay is Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun (2014) who find ethnic minority CEOs earn 
higher compensation than Caucasian CEOs.  
A number of recent studies examine whether executive pay differs by gender. The findings 
are mixed. In terms of compensation levels, some studies (Bell 2005; Selody 2011; Albanesi, 
Olivetti, and Prados 2015; Carter, Franco, and Gine 2015; Geiler and Renneboog 2015; Newton 
and Simutin 2015) find that females are paid less than males, others find no difference 
(Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Munoz-Bullon 2010; Bueja, Matollesy, and Spiropouslos 2012; 
Gregory-Smith, Main, and O'Reilly III 2014), whilst others (Gayle, Golan, and Miller 2012; 
Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun 2015) find they are paid more. In terms of pay performance 
sensitivity, both Selody (2010) and Albanesi, Olivetti, and Prados (2015) find this is weaker 
(stronger) for good (poor) performance, whilst Kulich et al. (2011) find it is weaker for all 
performance levels. In contrast, Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2012) find it is stronger for good 
performance yet similar for poor performance. 
Differences in Ability by Ethnic Minority Status 
Executive performance (and subsequent compensation) depends on general and firm-
specific skills combined with the effort of their application. These skills, or ability, may be 
lower for ethnic minorities. First, they may have less valuable functional experience. For 
example, African American executives are more likely to hold racialized positions (Collins 
1997), and work in public relations, human resources or general counsel (Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff 2011). Second, whilst the majority of Hispanic and Asian executives come from the 
upper and upper middle class (as do Caucasians), African Americans come from middle or 
working class backgrounds (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2011). This lower social origin may 
result in lower tacit knowledge (Hansen 2001). Third, since social networks tend to be 
ethnically based, Caucasian executives may have a wider executive network (McDonald, Lin, 
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and Ao 2009) thus increasing their value to the firm (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013). 
Fourth, minority status may subject executives to greater visibility, higher pressure to perform, 
and isolation resulting in a deliberate attempt not to outperform (Kanter 1977). Finally, the 
processes that generate ethnic minority executives may differ. If minorities are discriminated 
against and face higher hurdles, they could have above average ability. Alternatively, if they 
are promoted through affirmative action policies they could be of lower ability.  
Differences in Risk Tolerance by Ethnic Minority Status 
Differences in executives’ risk tolerance levels, investment preferences, and personal wealth 
levels may impact compensation structures, levels, and equity incentive holdings. These 
personal characteristics may differ between Caucasian and ethnic minority executives. 
Evidence on whether African Americans are more risk averse than whites is mixed (Sahm 
2007; Barsky et al. 1997). However, African Americans tend to hold a lower proportion of 
risky assets (Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro 2008), possibly reflecting not just higher risk aversion 
but lower expected returns (Kezdi and Willis 2009) due to unfamiliarity of the stock market 
(Brimmer 1988). Hispanics do not display a difference in risk aversion (Sahm 2007; Barsky et 
al. 1997) or expected returns (Kezdi and Willis 2009), but do hold a lower proportion of risky 
assets (Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro 2008). Comparable evidence for Asians is scant, but 
suggests higher risk tolerance than whites (Barsky et al. 1997).  
African Americans and Hispanics own less wealth than whites after controlling for lower 
income levels (Brimmer 1988; Smith 1995; Gittleman and Wolff 2004), which is possibly due 
to lower investment returns, lower inheritance (Gittleman and Wolff 2004), and higher 
consumption (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov 2009). For African American executives, their 
lower economic origin also implies lower parental wealth, reinforcing the expectation of lower 
financial risk tolerance. It is suggested that, “for the vast majority of high income Black 
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families, this current generation is the first to have any real money to invest. Many of them are, 
perhaps understandably, averse to taking risks” [Alexis quoted in Loury (1998)]. 
We hypothesize that African American and Hispanic executives will prefer less variable 
compensation structures and lower equity incentive holdings than Caucasians, whilst the 
opposite holds for Asians. Since risk averse executives require additional compensation to 
compensate for more variable compensation or firm equity holding (Conyon, Core, and Guay 
2011), it is important to control for this when examining compensation level differences 
(Carter, Franco, and Gine 2015). 
Data  
Our executive compensation measures are derived from ExecuComp, and we therefore seek 
to classify executives on this database by their ethnic minority status.  
Ethnic Minority Status of Executives 
Our starting point is the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) director database, 
which reports the ethnicity of board directors (executive and outside directors) on S&P 1500 
firms as either Caucasian, African American, Asian, Hispanic or Native American. We clean 
this database to correct inaccuracies in the unique director codes assigned by IRRC.2 This 
results in 32,612 unique directors over 1996-2011, of whom 1,680 are ethnic minorities, 18,215 
are Caucasian, and 12,717 are unclassified. However, due to inaccuracies with the IRRC 
identification of ethnicity (e.g., 343 of the 1,680 ethnic minority directors have inconsistent 
ethnic classification) we manually check each of these 1,680 directors.  
                                                          
 
2 Of the 34,938 unique codes we identify 869 directors which have more than one unique code, and 1,209 
unique codes for which there is more than one director. We identify individual directors using director name, firm 
CUSIP, and date of birth. 
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To do so, we employ published lists of ethnic minority board directors/executives and search 
for these individuals on IRRC. We identify 684 IRRC directors as ethnic minorities in this way3 
(605 of whom were originally identified as minorities on IRRC). Of the remaining 1,075 IRRC 
minority directors, we are able to verify the minority status of 371 using online biographies, 
178 using online photos, and 451 using names (Hispanic or Asian sounding name consistent 
with IRRC classification of either minority). 62 of the 1,075 are concluded to be Caucasian 
using online biographies and photos. For the 13 remaining directors we are unable to verify 
ethnicity and accept the IRRC classification. We therefore have 19,933 directors with known 
ethnicity consisting 18,235 Caucasian and 1,698 ethnic minorities (consisting 682 African 
American, 616 Asian, 398 Hispanic, and two Native Americans).4 From the above sources, we 
also identify a further 56 executives (that are not on IRRC) as ethnic minorities. 
We match these 19,989 individuals of known ethnicity with ExecuComp executives, using 
names and firm codes. We match 8,128 executives, 433 of which are ethnic minorities, 
comprising 114 African American, 211 Asian, and 108 Hispanics. We examine years 1992-
2011, resulting in 68,962 executive-firm-year observations, reported on a yearly basis in Table 
1. The number of ethnic minorities increases from 70 to 152 over the period, driven largely by 
Asians (37 to 88) and Hispanics (14 to 40), rather than African Americans (19 to 24).  
                                                          
 
3 328 African American (Executive Leadership Council 2004, 2008; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2011; 
http://www.blackenterprise.com/mag/power-in-the-boardroom/; http://www.blackenterprise.com/be-lists/the-
100-most-powerful-executives-in-corporate-america/4/; http://www.blackentrepreneurprofile.com/fortune-500-
ceos/; http://www.thefreelibrary.com/America's+most+powerful+Black+executives%3A+B.E.+selects+40+all-
stars...-a013506897; http://savoynetwork.com/category/the-list/.), 168 Asian (Committee of 100 2004, 2007; 
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics 2011; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2011; 
http://www.china4us.com/SinoCEO.htm; http://www.88yp.com/Executives.htm.), and 189 Hispanic (Hispanic 
Business Com 2002, 2004, 2005; Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility 2007; Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff 2011; http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/branded/2013/elite/boardroom_elite_bios.asp;     
http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/2009/1/28/2009_boardroom_elite_complete_list.htm). These website links 
were accessed in December 2012. 
4 We backfill ethnicity information on directors for earlier IRRC years for which ethnicity is not reported. Of 
a total 234,858 person-firm year observations, ethnicity is established for 194,800. 
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TABLE 1  
Compensation Variables  
We examine three measures of annual executive compensation. The first is salary plus 
bonus. The second, which we define as total pay, consists of salary, bonus, other pay, non-
equity incentives, stock grants, and option grants.5 Our third measure, total ex-post pay, is 
identical to total pay except that option grants is replaced by the value realized from the exercise 
of options during the year. The latter variable is referred to as option gain.6  
In addition to these measures, we examine the rank of an executive’s pay level within his/her 
executive team. For each executive in each firm year, we assign a rank by number depending 
on where he/she ranks in compensation. The executive with the highest compensation is ranked 
one, the second highest ranked two, etc. We do this for the three compensation measures, and 
assign ranks to all executives for whom the compensation measure is available.  
We also examine the value of equity incentives held. Option holding is the value of in-the-
money unexercisable and exercisable options.7 Stock and option holding is the value of option 
holding, restricted stock holding, and stock owned.8 
The above variables are converted to 2011 US dollars using the consumer price index, then 
winsorized at the one percent level. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2, along with 
                                                          
 
5 The ExecuComp variable names for these variables are (upper case in parentheses); total pay (TDC1), salary 
(SALARY), bonus (BONUS), other pay (OTHCOMP plus DEFER_RPT_AS_COMP_TOT), non-equity 
incentives (NONEQ_INCENT), stock grants (STOCK_AWARDS_FV) and option grants 
(OPTION_AWARDS_FV). Prior to a reporting change in 2006, certain variables (and hence total pay) are 
constructed slightly differently as follows: other pay (OTHANN and ALLOTHTOT), non-equity incentives 
(LTIP), stock grants (RSTKGRNT), and option grants (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE). 
6 The ExecuComp variable names for total ex-post pay and option gain are TDC2 and OPT_EXER_VAL 
respectively. 
7 ExecuComp variables OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL and OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_EST_VAL 
respectively. 
8 Restricted stock holding is ExecuComp variable STOCK_UNVEST_VAL. Stock owned is calculated by 
multiplying the number of shares owned by the fiscal year end share price (PRCCF), where the former is calculated 
as the number of shares and unvested restricted stock owned (SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) minus the number of 
unvested restricted stock owned (STOCK_UNVEST_NUM). 
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averages for minorities and significance levels from t-tests with Caucasians. Ethnic minorities 
earn lower cash compensation (salary, bonus and other pay), and higher incentive pay (non-
equity incentives, stock grants, and option grants), resulting in higher total pay. Despite higher 
option grants and total pay for minorities, option gains are no different and total ex-post pay is 
only slightly higher.  
TABLE 2  
Control Variables 
We employ executive and firm specific controls from the existing compensation literature 
(Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Graham, Li, and Qiu 2011). We collect the gender and age of 
executives from ExecuComp. Company tenure is not reported comprehensively on 
ExecuComp. We therefore also collect the number of years of credited service the executive 
has under the company’s pension plan, tenure as CEO, and company tenure from the BoardEx 
database. We employ the highest number from these sources as our tenure variable.9  
Following Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we allocate each executive to one of 11 
occupational titles ranked in the following order; CEO or executive chair, vice chair, president, 
CFO, COO, other chief officer, executive VP, senior VP, group VP, VP, other occupations. 
The latter includes executives who do not hold any of the preceding titles, including the 
position of CEO, chair, vice chair, president or COO of a division or subsidiary.10 We identify 
executives holding positions in public relations, human resources and general counsel. For the 
pay rank analysis, we control for the number of ExecuComp executives within each firm year. 
                                                          
 
9 The names for these three ExecuComp variables are JOINED_CO, RET_YRS, and BECAME CEO 
respectively whilst the BoardEx variable is TIME (YRS.) IN COMPANY.  
10 We identify occupational titles using the ExecuComp variables TITLEANN, CEOANN, and CFOANN. 
TITLEANN reports detailed titles and is available for 58,645 of the 68,962 observations with 7,874 unique titles 
which we check by hand. We supplement this with CEOANN and CFOANN which identify the CEO and CFO 
for 26,659 and 374 of the 68,962 observations respectively. 
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Stock return is the annual stock return over the fiscal year and is from the CRSP database. 
Firm risk is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. Other variables are 
from Compustat. Sales is our proxy for firm size, in millions of 2011 US dollars. Return on 
assets (ROA) is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to total 
assets. Market-to-book is calculated as market value of equity minus book value of equity plus 
total assets to total assets. Leverage is long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total 
assets. CAPEX is net capital expenditure to total assets. R&D is research and development 
expenditure to total assets. Cash is calculated as cash and short term investments to total 
assets.11 These variables are winsorized at the one percent level.  
Summary statistics for the controls are reported in Table 3. Compared to Caucasians, ethnic 
minority executives are more likely to be female, younger, of lower tenure and seniority, and 
to work in public relations, human resources and general counsel. Ethnic minority executives 
work in larger firms, with higher risk, market-to-book, R&D and cash, lower leverage and 
CAPEX, but comparable share return and profitability. 
TABLE 3  
Empirical Results 
Compensation Level and Ethnic Minority Status 
To examine the impact of ethnic minority status on compensation levels, we employ an OLS 
model including the above controls, year and firm fixed effects.12 Firm fixed effects play an 
important role in explaining executive compensation (Graham, Li, and Qiu 2011) and may 
                                                          
 
11 The Compustat data item specifications for these variables are as follows: Sales is data item 12; ROA is data 
item 18 / data item 6; Market-to-book is (data item 25 * data item 24 - data item 60 + data item 6) / data item 6; 
Leverage is (data item 9 + data item 34) / data item 6; CAPEX is (data item 128 - data item 107) / data item 6; 
R&D is Max (0, data item 46) / data item 6; Cash is data item 308 / data item 6. 
12 Using all control variables reduces the sample from 68,962 (for which ethnicity and salary are available) to 
51,843. Summary statistics for this smaller sample are reported in a separate Appendix (Tables A1-A3) which is 
available from the author upon request. 
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capture time invariant firm specific factors that are correlated with both compensation and 
ethnicity. We employ the natural logarithm of the pay variables and firm sales, and the 
quadratic term for age (Bertrand and Hallock 2001). The results are shown in Table 4.  
TABLE 4  
For ethnic minorities as a whole, neither salary and bonus nor total pay differs significantly 
from Caucasians. Total ex-post pay however is significantly lower, the coefficient of -0.068 
implying a difference of 6.6 percent.13 There are substantial differences across ethnic groups. 
The compensation of Asian executives does not differ significantly from Caucasians for any of 
the three compensation measures. For Hispanics, pay is higher across all three measures but 
only significantly so for total pay. For African Americans, compensation is significantly lower 
for all three measures. The implied differences are of a substantial magnitude. In percentage 
terms, African Americans earn nine percent less than Caucasians in both salary plus bonus and 
total pay, and 17 percent less total ex-post pay. In dollar terms, the differences are $109k, 
$374k, and $687k.14 The lower total ex-post pay for ethnic minorities as a whole appears 
largely driven by African Americans. 
Consistent with several previous studies, female executives earn significantly lower 
compensation across all three pay measures. It is noteworthy that the negative impact for 
African Americans is larger than that for females. Other estimated coefficients are consistent 
with prior findings. Total pay is positively correlated with age, size, profitability, share returns, 
market-to-book, cash, and negatively correlated with risk and leverage. 
                                                          
 
13 To convert the coefficient into a percentage difference we use the following formula: (EXP(-0.068)-1)*100. 
14 To estimate dollar differences we multiply the implied percentage difference by the mean compensation 
measure for Caucasians as reported in Table 2.  
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Robustness Tests 
In this section we test the robustness of our key finding that African American executives 
earn less than Caucasians. To control for omitted time variant variables at the firm level, we 
employ an ordered probit model with pay rank as the dependent variable. We include all 
executive controls and the number of firm-year ExecuComp executives. The results, reported 
in Table 5, show the estimated coefficient for African American is significantly positive in 
each regression whilst the coefficients for Asian and Hispanic are insignificant.   
TABLE 5  
The coefficients imply that African Americans face a 21-26 percent probability of being 
ranked lower than Caucasians. These pay rank results provide a useful alternative analysis, 
suggesting African Americans are not just paid less on average than Caucasians in the cross 
section of firms, but often less than Caucasians in the same firm whom they should rank 
above.15 The latter is arguably a more important difference. Executives usually have distinct 
firm roles and a benchmark pay level may not be available internally or externally (at below 
CEO level). Whilst the firm may have imprecise information on (and no control over) 
benchmark pay, it is in control of within-firm pay rank. If the pay rank difference is due to 
discrimination (rather than unobservable executive characteristics) then the behavioral 
implications are significant. Differences in internal pay rank are more visible to executives than 
pay level differences from the cross-sectional average of comparable executives (hence wage 
discrimination claims usually involve intra-firm comparisons) whilst intra-firm pay rank (after 
controlling for pay level) has been shown to impact employee well-being (Brown et al. 2008) 
and the propensity to quit (Pfeifer and Schneck 2012). 
                                                          
 
15 A lower pay level does not imply a lower pay rank. For example, consider the case of executives A, B, C 
and D whose respective positions, compensation levels, and firms are: A (senior VP, $1m, firm 1); B (VP, $750k, 
firm 1); C (senior VP, $900k, firm 2); D (VP, $750k, firm 2). Executive C earns lower compensation than 
executive A (his/her comparable executive by seniority), yet has the same pay rank.  
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Next, we employ industry rather than firm fixed effects. One possibility is that African 
Americans self-select into high paying firms, and whilst they may earn relatively less at such 
firms, they may not earn less than the average Caucasian once such firm specific differences 
are removed. However, the results show the finding of lower pay for African Americans 
continues to hold.16  
Our results could be driven by omitted variables at the executive level such as human capital. 
To control for educational attainment we collect data from BoardEx (available for a subsample 
of 42,390 observations). We include three dummy variables (bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD) as 
follows; Bachelor’s is set equal to one if the executive has an undergraduate degree, zero if not; 
Master’s is set equal to one if the executive has a postgraduate master’s degree (including 
MBA), zero if not; PhD is set equal to one if the executive has a PhD, zero if not. Our key 
finding is robust to their inclusion.17 
Finally, we utilize different specifications for the dependent variables, control variables, and 
standard errors. We model the pay variables as levels rather than logs, employ alternative 
specifications of the age and tenure variables (quadratic for tenure; natural logarithm of age 
and natural logarithm of one plus tenure; dummy variables for the middle and upper tertiles of 
age and tenure), and control for autocorrelations in the errors by computing standard errors that 
are clustered at the executive and firm level. Our key results are robust to these alternative 
methods.18 
                                                          
 
16 Asian and Hispanic executives earn significantly higher pay, suggesting that they work for high paying 
firms. These results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A4). 
17 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A5). A higher proportion of ethnic minority 
executives achieve each level of education compared to Caucasians. 97.8, 53, and 7 percent of Caucasian 
executives have a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree and PhD respectively. The comparable figures for ethnic 
minorities are 98.5, 69, and 15 percent respectively. The comparable figures for each ethnic minority group are 
as follows: African Americans 100, 66, and 6 percent; Asians 98, 74, and 22 percent; Hispanics 98, 60 and 7 
percent. 
18 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Tables A6-A11). 
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Compensation Components and Ethnic Minority Status 
In this section we examine the separate components of pay. The results are reported in Table 
6. For African Americans, both salary, bonus, restricted stock grants and option gains are 
significantly lower than for Caucasians, whilst other pay, non-equity incentives, and option 
grants are no different. The implied dollar difference for salary of $25k is small relative to 
those for bonus ($143k), stock grants ($174k), and option gain ($454k).19  
TABLE 6  
For Asian executives, none of the pay components differ significantly from Caucasians. 
Hispanic executives earn significantly higher salary, other pay, non-equity incentives, and 
option grants, with implied dollar differences of $35k, $37k, $85k, and $818k respectively. 
However, Hispanics earn 31 percent ($439k) less on option exercise. Hence why Hispanics 
earn higher total pay but not higher total ex-post pay. The analysis for ethnic minorities as a 
whole shows higher option grants but lower option gains and hence why minorities earn lower 
total ex-post pay but not lower total pay.20  
We examine whether compensation structure, defined as fixed compensation (salary) to total 
pay, differs by ethnicity. The results show no difference for African American and Asian 
executives, though a significantly lower ratio for Hispanics.21 Our findings do not support the 
possibility that African Americans’ lower total pay is the result of a less risky pay package with 
a higher level and proportion of fixed compensation.  
We now investigate further the lower bonus and option gains to African Americans, since 
they account for a substantial fraction of the difference in pay. 
                                                          
 
19 For the non-salary components of compensation, a proportion of observations are censored at zero. To check 
that our results are robust to the issues associated with a censored dependent variable, we also employ a Tobit 
regression. The results, reported in the separate Appendix (Table A12), for African Americans are consistent with 
those in Table 6.   
20 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A13). 
21 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A14). 
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Bonus-Performance Sensitivity and Ethnic Minority Status 
To test whether bonus-performance sensitivity differs for ethnic minorities, we interact the 
ethnic minority dummy variables with ROA. Since pay-performance may differ by gender 
(Kulich et al. 2011) and occupational role (Aggarwal and Samwick 2003), we interact ROA 
with the female, occupational title, and the communications, HR or legal dummy variables. 
The results, reported in column 1 of Table 7, show the ROA coefficient to be 4.229 whilst the 
coefficient for African American * ROA is -3.877 and highly significant. A one unit increase 
in ROA increases bonus pay by 4.229 percent for Caucasians, whilst the corresponding figure 
for African Americans is 1.0 percent (EXP (0.04229-0.03877)). In contrast, Asian and Hispanic 
executives’ bonus-performance sensitivity is no different to Caucasians. 
TABLE 7 
We test whether the lower bonus-performance sensitivity for African Americans differs by 
ROA level, by including two variables, ROA ≥ median and ROA < median, which are set equal 
to ROA if the ROA is equal to or greater than, or less than the median ROA of 4.68 percent. 
We include the interaction of these two variables with the dummy variables described above. 
The results (column 2) show that African Americans’ bonuses are significantly less ROA 
sensitive than Caucasians at above median ROA, but not at below median ROA.  
In columns 3 and 4 we run the standard bonus regression on subsamples according to 
whether ROA is below or above the median respectively. For below median ROA, bonuses do 
not differ between African Americans and Caucasians. In contrast, for above median ROA the 
bonus is significantly lower for African Americans. Since bonuses are a significant fraction of 
total pay, this pattern also holds for salary and bonus, and total pay.22  
                                                          
 
22 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A15). 
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One explanation for these findings is that African Americans did not perform as well as 
Caucasians and were thus less responsible for any above average firm performance. An 
alternative explanation is discrimination or bias. However, the specific pattern observed is not 
precisely consistent with the theoretical predictions. Statistical discrimination theories predict 
(if the variance in ability or in the signal of ability is higher) lower pay-performance sensitivity, 
but this should be independent of performance level. The same outcome is predicted if there is 
biased stereotyping of African American executives. Alternatively, attribution bias theory 
suggests that African Americans could be attributed positive outcomes less strongly but 
negative outcomes more strongly.23 
Stock Option Gains and Ethnic Minority Status 
We perceive two potential explanations for the substantially lower option gains to African 
American and Hispanic executives. The first is less profitable timing of option exercise. This 
could be due to early option exercise as a result of higher risk aversion and/or lower personal 
wealth (Hall and Murphy 2002) or more profitable timing by Caucasian executives achieved 
by superior insider knowledge or self-serving managerial behavior.24 It is conceivable that 
minorities are less able to time exercise to coincide with a high share price (manipulated or 
otherwise) because of weaker information, due for example to narrower social networks within 
the firm. Testing this explanation thoroughly is beyond the scope of the paper.25 
                                                          
 
23 A risk preference explanation does not appear feasible, since African American executives would not 
rationally choose a bonus plan that rewarded them less for above average performance but equally for below 
average performance. 
24 Exercise timing has been shown to coincide with a high share price (Aboody et al. 2008). Self-serving 
managerial behavior at the exercise date could take the form of earnings management (Bartov and Mohanram 
2004), backdating (Cicero 2009), or voluntary disclosure (Brockman, Martin, and Puckett 2010). 
25 As a basic test of whether ethnic minorities exercise options early, we model as our dependent variable the 
annual number of exercised options divided by the annual number of exercisable options. The results, reported in 
the separate Appendix (Table A16), show no evidence of significantly positive impacts for ethnic minorities, and 
therefore no evidence of early exercise. Exercised options is ExecuComp variable OPT_EXER_NUM, and 
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Alternatively, the lower gains may reflect a lower value of options held. Although, as 
showed above, ethnic minorities do not receive lower option grants within our sample period, 
this may have occurred prior to their being reported on ExecuComp. Additionally, option terms 
(such as re-pricing) may be favorable to Caucasians. We therefore examine whether option 
holding value differs for ethnic minorities. The results, reported in Table 8, show that African 
Americans’ option holdings are a significant 34 percent lower, or in dollar terms a substantial 
$2.9m. Option holding value for Asians and Hispanics are not significantly different from 
Caucasians.  We next examine whether the lower option gains hold after controlling for the 
lagged (t-1) value of option holding. The results in column 2 show that the coefficient for 
African American is now insignificant, whilst the coefficient for Hispanic is still significantly 
negative. We conclude that the lower gains to African Americans are due to lower option 
holding, whilst the lower gains to Hispanics could instead reflect less profitable option exercise.  
TABLE 8  
Equity Incentive Holdings, Compensation and Ethnic Minority Status 
We examine whether equity incentive holdings differ by ethnic minority status, modelling 
stock and option holdings as our dependent variable. The results, reported in Table 9, are 
consistent with our expectation that African Americans will hold lower incentives due to higher 
risk aversion and lower wealth. African American executives hold a significant 33 percent less 
equity incentives than Caucasians, implying a substantial dollar difference of $16.7m. For 
Asian executives, total holdings are a significant 17 percent higher, implying a dollar difference 
of $8.5m. Hispanics hold less equity incentives, but the difference is statistically insignificant.  
TABLE 9 
                                                          
 
exercisable options is the sum of OPT_EXER_NUM and exercisable options at year end (ExecuComp variable 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM). 
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We check whether our key findings on compensation levels hold after controlling for these 
differences in incentive holdings. We adopt a similar approach to Carter, Franco, and Gine 
(2015), including the lagged value of incentives in the compensation regressions. The results, 
reported in columns 3-6, show that the coefficient for African American continues to be 
significantly negative and of comparable magnitude in both the salary and bonus, and total pay 
regressions. Similarly, the coefficient for Hispanic continues to be significantly positive in the 
total pay regression, whilst the coefficient for Asian continues to be insignificant. We conclude 
that the lower pay for African Americans is not explained by their lower equity incentives.26   
Ethnic Minority Pay Setters, Compensation and Ethnic Minority Status 
If the lower pay to African Americans were due to discrimination, it may diminish where 
other ethnic minorities, particularly African Americans, are involved in setting pay. Since CEO 
pay is set by the compensation committee whilst lower level executive pay is set by the CEO 
in conjunction with this committee, we firstly examine whether the lower pay to African 
Americans holds for both the highest ranked executives (CEOs and executive chairs) and lower 
level executives. The results show that whilst lower level African American executives earn 
lower pay, CEOs and executive chairs do not.27 Given this, we examine the impact of pay setter 
ethnic minority status on the subsample of lower level executives only. 
                                                          
 
26 For robustness, we repeat the analysis using the portfolio delta (instead of stock and option holding), defined 
as the change in the dollar value of the executive’s firm wealth for a one percent change in the stock price. We 
employ the dataset of Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2013) which includes ExecuComp executives for 1992-2010. 
The results, reported in the separate Appendix (Table A17), are consistent with those in Table 9. African 
Americans face much lower powered incentives compared to Caucasian executives, receiving 19 percent less (or 
$125k given an average delta of $657k) for each one percent increase in value. Asians face significantly higher 
powered incentives, whilst Hispanics do not differ. Inclusion of lagged delta in the compensation regressions does 
not impact the significantly negative coefficient for African American or the significantly positive coefficient for 
Hispanic. 
27 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Tables A18-A19). For the total pay measure, we find that 
ethnic minority CEOs earn significantly more (at the ten percent significance level) than Caucasian CEOs, a result 
consistent with that of Hill, Upadhyay, and Beekun (2015).  
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Using the IRRC data, we identify the ethnicity of all compensation committee members for 
12,289 of the 23,049 firm year observations for lower level executives.28  We include a dummy 
variable set equal to one if, for the executive firm year observation, there is an ethnic minority 
member on the compensation committee, and interact this with the ethnic minority dummy 
variables.29 The results, reported in columns 1-3 of Table 10, show the coefficient for the 
interactive variables to be statistically insignificant.30 To test whether African American 
executive pay is higher where there is an African American on the compensation committee, 
we include a dummy variable set equal to one if, for the executive firm year observation, there 
is an African American member on the compensation committee, and interact this with the 
ethnic minority dummy variables.31 The results, shown in columns 4-6 show there is no 
significant impact.  
TABLE 10 
We consider the ethnic minority status of the CEO, by including a dummy variable set equal 
to one for executive firm years where the firm CEO is an ethnic minority32 and interact this 
with the ethnic minority dummy variable.33 The results show the coefficient for the interaction 
of ethnic minority CEOs and ethnic minority executives to be statistically insignificant. Due to 
                                                          
 
28 Of these 12,289 observations, 834 are observations for ethnic minority executives comprising 253 
observations for African Americans, 368 observations for Asians, and 213 observations for Hispanics. 
29 3,766 of the 12,289 observations are associated with an ethnic minority member on the compensation 
committee. 337 of the 834 observations for ethnic minority executives are associated with an ethnic minority 
member on the compensation committee. The corresponding numbers for individual ethnic minorities are as 
follows: African Americans (102 of 253 observations); Asians (161 of 368 observations); Hispanics (74 of 213 
observations). 
30 In additional tests, reported in the separate Appendix (Table A20), we find no significant impact on ethnic 
minority executives as a group.  
31 2,490 of the 12,289 observations are associated with an African American member on the compensation 
committee, whilst for African American executives this is the case for 69 of the 253 observations. 
32 Where the executive chair earns a higher salary and bonus than the CEO, we assume that the executive chair 
is more influential in setting pay and employ his/her ethnic minority status rather than the CEO.  
33 Of the 23,049 observations for lower level executives, 21,331 observations have CEO ethnicity available, 
for which 721 are associated with an ethnic minority CEO. 142 of the 1,248 observations for ethnic minority 
executives are associated with an ethnic minority CEO.  
22 
 
small sample size, it is not possible to examine the impact of ethnic minority CEOs or African 
American CEOs on African American executive pay.34  
Whilst the CEO and compensation committee set executive pay for lower level executives, 
the board of directors has ultimate responsibility, and we therefore examine the impact of ethnic 
minority directors. Using the IRRC data, we identify the ethnicity of all board directors for 
10,902 of the 23,049 observations for lower level executives. We include a dummy variable 
set equal to one if the board has at least one ethnic minority member (excluding the sample 
executive if he/she is a board member) and interact this with the ethnic minority dummy 
variables.35 The results show that ethnic minority board member presence has no significant 
impact on the pay of ethnic minorities as a whole or African Americans. Finally, we use a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the board has an African American director, and interact 
this with the ethnic minority dummy variables.36 The results however are again insignificant.   
We conclude that the presence of ethnic minorities and African Americans in pay setter 
positions does not impact the lower compensation of African American executives. We 
therefore find no evidence to support a discrimination explanation. We are however unable to 
rule this out since other minorities may discriminate, and African Americans on compensation 
committees or boards may have a weak influence due to being in a numerical minority.  
                                                          
 
34 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A21). Of the 21,331 observations with CEO 
ethnicity available, there are 355 African American executive firm year observations. However, just seven of these 
355 observations overlap with the 721 observations for which there is an ethnic minority CEO. For the 141 
executive firm year observations where the CEO is an African American, there are just two overlapping 
observations (with the 355). Increasing the sample of CEOs to also include female CEOs increases the overlapping 
observations to just 17, and thus does not permit meaningful analysis either.  
35 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A22). 7,426 of these 10,902 observations are 
associated with an ethnic minority board member. 560 of the 737 observations for ethnic minority executives are 
associated with an ethnic minority board member. The corresponding numbers for individual ethnic minorities 
are as follows: African Americans (206 of 236 observations); Asians (209 of 308 observations); Hispanics (145 
of 193 observations). 
36 The results are reported in the separate Appendix (Table A23). 6,197 of the 10,902 observations are 
associated with an African American board member, whilst for African American executives this is the case for 
182 of the 236 observations. 
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Conclusion 
We show that ethnic minority status is associated with different executive compensation 
outcomes. Whilst we find no difference between Asian, Hispanic, and Caucasian executives, 
African Americans earn significantly lower pay. This difference is as large as that for female 
executives, and is robust to different econometric methods. The lower total pay can be traced 
to lower salary, bonus, stock grants and stock option exercise. The lower bonus is due to lower 
sensitivity to above average firm performance. Our findings contribute to the racial pay gap 
literature by showing that a gap also exists at the executive level and to the executive pay 
literature by showing that ethnicity is an important managerial attribute.  
There are several potential explanations for the lower pay to African American executives. 
One is that African Americans are risk averse, thus preferring less variable pay and lower equity 
incentives, with subsequent lower overall pay. Whilst we find no difference in pay structures, 
African Americans do hold significantly lower equity incentives. However, these lower 
incentives do not explain the lower compensation. Another explanation is discrimination. 
However, if the lower pay were caused by discrimination, we may expect it to diminish when 
there is ethnic minority presence on the compensation committee or board of directors. Yet we 
find no evidence of this. Rather than discrimination, the lower pay (and pay-performance 
sensitivity) may reflect underperformance by African Americans. Since the lower pay occurs 
only for executives below the CEO level (for whom individual performance data is not 
available), we are unable to test this. Such underperformance could however be due to lower 
ability as a result of lower social origin, narrower social networks, or affirmative action 
policies. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that an omitted executive characteristic, 
correlated with both African Americans and lower pay, is driving our results.   
Our inability to pinpoint precisely why African Americans earn lower compensation limits 
our understanding and interpretation. Distinguishing between the above explanations is 
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imperative, and we hope future research will do so. However, we conclude that the small select 
group of African Americans who reach the upper echelons of corporate America appear on 
average to be disadvantaged, either by discrimination and/or bias, or by lower ability and 
performance. This conclusion is supported by Guest’s (2015) finding that this same group are 
promoted less, demoted more and have higher turnover, as well as the low growth of African 
American executives over our sample period. Such lower achievement at the executive level is 
a concern. Organizational diversity is a stated goal for most firms, and African American 
executives may increase the representation of African Americans at lower levels by mentoring 
and motivating them, the latter by demonstrating that African Americans are valued within the 
organization. Our conclusion for African American executives thus potentially has 
implications far broader than the immediate impact on the executives themselves.  
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE OF EXECUTIVES 
 ExecuComp 
ethnicity 
unknown 
  ExecuComp ethnicity known  
  All Caucasian Ethnic minority 
Year    All African 
American 
Asian Hispanic 
1992 5,207 2,838 2,768 70 19 37 14 
1993 6,537 3,284 3,197 87 21 46 20 
1994 7,180 3,509 3,414 95 23 48 24 
1995 7,390 3,757 3,644 113 28 50 35 
1996 7,707 3,989 3,866 123 25 57 41 
1997 7,941 4,122 3,970 152 30 72 50 
1998 8,372 4,284 4,110 174 35 86 53 
1999 8,093 4,121 3,930 191 41 92 58 
2000 7,625 3,917 3,717 200 46 94 60 
2001 7,620 3,764 3,561 203 41 104 58 
2002 7,844 3,715 3,513 202 44 102 56 
2003 8,179 3,638 3,434 204 45 101 58 
2004 7,511 3,393 3,196 197 44 96 57 
2005 6,321 3,067 2,883 184 36 98 50 
2006 7,676 3,296 3,098 198 44 105 49 
2007 8,465 3,341 3,123 218 43 125 50 
2008 8,173 3,091 2,873 218 45 125 48 
2009 7,735 2,864 2,675 189 32 109 48 
2010 7,319 2,682 2,499 183 32 106 45 
2011 6,271 2,290 2,138 152 24 88 40 
Observations 149,166 68,962 65,609 3,353 698 1,741 914 
Executives  31,257 8,128 7,695 433 114 211 108 
Executive-firm observations 33,114 9,664 9,153 511 138 250 123 
Firms  3,298 2,856 2,801 398 122 199 108 
NOTES: The sample of executives is drawn from the ExecuComp database. The ethnicity of these executives is established using the IRRC 
database, internet searches and various publications. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION MEASURES ($000S)  
 All executives Caucasian Ethnic minority 
   All African American Asian Hispanic 
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Salary and bonus 68,962 1,211.5 862.5 1,190.4 48.9 7,755.9 1,216.3 1,118.5*** 1,215.8 1,028.7*** 1,215.1 
Total pay 64,045 4,234.5 2,272.4 5,617.0 197.3 34,188.8 4,207.9 4,765.7*** 5,441.3*** 4,615.7*** 4,566.9* 
Total ex-post pay 68,665 4,036.2 1,761.4 6,525.7 134.4 42,461.5 4,026.2 4,232.3* 4,249.6 4,273.5 4,140.6 
Rank (Salary and bonus) 68,949 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.0 15.0 2.5 2.8*** 3.7*** 2.5 2.7*** 
Rank (Total pay) 64,042 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.0 12.0 2.3 2.5*** 3.2*** 2.3 2.5*** 
Rank (Total ex-post pay) 68,663 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.0 15.0 2.6 2.9*** 3.7*** 2.7 2.8*** 
Salary 68,962 651.3 574.6 359.5 27.0 1,905.2 653.1 614.6*** 625.5** 579*** 673.9* 
Bonus 68,962 551.8 232.9 973.6 0.0 6,351.3 554.5 497.9*** 583.2 442.5*** 538.4 
Other pay 68,668 197.5 44.6 544.2 0.0 4,185.7 198.3 181*** 211.3 154.4*** 208.5 
Non-equity incentives 68,962 326.3 0.0 818.6 0.0 5,033.7 324.0 369.6*** 495.5*** 332.4 344.2 
Stock grants 68,709 639.2 0.0 1,634.4 0.0 10,182.4 629.6 827.7*** 830.1*** 816.2*** 847.8*** 
Option grants 64,078 1,549.8 416.2 3,194.2 0.0 20,784.8 1,532.2 1,901.1*** 2,156.9*** 1,929.5*** 1,660.4 
Option gain 68,665 1,424.7 0.0 4,359.4 0.0 30,111.4 1,419.2 1,531.3 1,229.8 1,727.4*** 1,385.7 
Option holding 63,372 8,624.6 1,699.1 19,677.3 0.0 132,652.3 8,554.1 10,039.7*** 9,151.3 11,267.1*** 8,312.2 
Stock and option holding 59,978 50,081.2 9,027.8 147,894.9 4.8 1,129,660.8 50,784.5 36,167.9*** 16,518.0*** 45,336.6 32,426.3*** 
NOTES: Compensation data is from the ExecuComp database. Asterisks in columns 9-12 indicate significance levels from two-sided t-tests between ethnic minority and Caucasian executives. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON EXECUTIVE AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS  
 All executives Caucasian Ethnic minority 
   All African 
American 
Asian Hispanic 
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Executive characteristics            
Female 68,962 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04 
Age 68,575 53.34 53.00 8.42 21.00 95.00 53.47 50.86*** 51.17*** 50.92*** 50.52*** 
Tenure 64,559 17.25 15.50 11.81 0.00 43.00 17.38 14.56*** 12.91*** 12.97*** 18.79*** 
Communications, HR or legal 58,946 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.000 1.000 0.020 0.035*** 0.127*** 0.011** 0.013 
Occupational title             
CEO / chair 58,946 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.43*** 0.25*** 0.51** 0.42*** 
Vice chair 58,946 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
President  58,946 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08** 0.09 
CFO 58,946 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.11** 0.13*** 0.08** 0.15*** 
COO 58,946 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Other chief officer 58,946 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.02* 0.01 
Executive VP 58,946 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Senior VP 58,946 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.04 0.05* 
Group VP 58,946 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
VP 58,946 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Other occupations 58,946 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
# Executives 68,962 6.10 6.00 1.40 1.00 15.00 6.10 6.13 6.37*** 5.93*** 6.33*** 
Firm characteristics             
Sales  68,784 8,163.6 2,332.2 16,121.5 67.3 106,058.5 8,089.6 9,608.2*** 16,635.8*** 6,573.1*** 10,016.4*** 
Share return 67,085 0.17 0.12 0.46 -0.75 2.12 0.17 0.17 0.14* 0.19 0.15 
Firm risk  67,011 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.35 0.10 0.11*** 0.10** 0.13*** 0.10 
ROA 68,790 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.34 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04*** 0.05*** 
Market-to-book 68,106 1.93 1.48 1.28 0.81 8.19 1.92 2.10*** 1.92 2.19*** 2.05*** 
Leverage  68,529 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.79 0.24 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.25* 
CAPEX  65,141 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.05 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
R&D 68,815 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02 
Cash 68,793 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.68 0.12 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.11 
NOTES: The executive characteristic variables are from the ExecuComp database. The variable tenure is from the ExecuComp and BoardEx databases. The variables share return and firm risk from the CRSP database. 
The other firm characteristic variables from the Compustat database. Asterisks in columns 9-12 indicate significance levels from two-sided t-tests between minority and Caucasian executives. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
REGRESSION OF COMPENSATION ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS 
 Dependent variable 
 Log (Salary and bonus) Log (Total pay) Log (Total ex-post pay) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 3.308*** 3.305*** 2.817*** 2.813*** 1.252*** 1.247*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.135) (0.135) (0.152) (0.151) 
Ethnic minority  -0.022  0.013  -0.068***  
 (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.021)  
African American  -0.094***  -0.093***  -0.187*** 
  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.033) 
Asian  -0.006  0.043  -0.035 
  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.034) 
Hispanic  0.028  0.079***  0.005 
  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.036) 
Female -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Communications, HR or legal -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.144*** -0.138*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log (Sales) 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
ROA 0.880*** 0.879*** 0.579*** 0.577*** 1.268*** 1.266*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.066) (0.066) (0.074) (0.074) 
Share return 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log (Firm risk) -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market-to-book 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.241*** -0.242*** -0.332*** -0.333*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) 
CAPEX -0.051 -0.052 0.442*** 0.441*** 0.223* 0.221* 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.109) (0.109) (0.127) (0.127) 
R&D -0.002 -0.007 -0.830*** -0.837*** -1.757*** -1.766*** 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.285) (0.285) (0.328) (0.328) 
Cash 0.072* 0.071* 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.061) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.6110 0.6111 0.6572 0.6574 0.6028 0.6029 
Observations  51,843 51,843 51,495 51,495 51,785 51,785 
NOTES: OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log of the variable value. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, and 
occupational title dummies are included in every regression but not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
REGRESSION OF COMPENSATION RANK ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS 
 Dependent variable 
 Rank (Salary and bonus) Rank (Total pay) Rank (Total ex-post pay) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ethnic minority  0.043**  0.026  0.039*  
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021)  
African American  0.264***  0.210***  0.223*** 
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
Asian  -0.023  -0.021  0.015 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Hispanic  -0.017  -0.037  -0.060 
  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
Female 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.139*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Communications, HR or legal 0.211*** 0.200*** 0.287*** 0.278*** 0.258*** 0.250*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
# Executives 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1950 0.1952 0.1838 0.1840 0.1453 0.1454 
Observations  55,742 55,742 55,366 55,366 55,677 55,677 
NOTES: Ordered probit regression where dependent variable is compensation rank within each firm year. This variable takes on a value of one 
for the highest paid executive, two for the second highest paid executive, etc. Occupational title dummies are included in every regression 
but not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent 
levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
TABLE 6 
REGRESSION OF COMPENSATION COMPONENTS ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS 
 Dependent variable 
 Log 
(Salary) 
Log 
(Bonus) 
Log 
(Other)  
Log (Non-
equity 
incentive) 
Log (Stock 
grants) 
Log 
(Option 
grants) 
Log 
(Option 
gain) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 3.510*** 0.395 -1.996*** -4.585*** -3.580*** -2.626*** -10.386*** 
 (0.092) (0.428) (0.260) (0.394) (0.463) (0.538) (0.610) 
African American -0.039** -0.299*** 0.059 -0.073 -0.323** -0.001 -0.386** 
 (0.019) (0.106) (0.065) (0.120) (0.138) (0.127) (0.156) 
Asian -0.020 -0.022 -0.098* 0.005 0.183 0.090 -0.211 
 (0.018) (0.092) (0.057) (0.091) (0.116) (0.118) (0.134) 
Hispanic 0.052** -0.036 0.172*** 0.233* 0.157 0.428*** -0.370** 
 (0.021) (0.112) (0.065) (0.121) (0.141) (0.130) (0.168) 
Female -0.044*** -0.108* -0.048 0.014 -0.036 -0.193** -0.243*** 
 (0.011) (0.058) (0.036) (0.064) (0.075) (0.075) (0.088) 
Age 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.104*** 0.172*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.004*** -0.008*** 0.004*** 0.009*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 0.047*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Communications, HR or legal -0.049*** 0.039 -0.162*** -0.127* -0.011 -0.246*** -0.259** 
 (0.012) (0.071) (0.040) (0.075) (0.089) (0.089) (0.110) 
Log (Sales) 0.148*** 0.396*** 0.297*** 0.301*** 0.298*** 0.551*** 0.722*** 
 (0.007) (0.030) (0.018) (0.028) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) 
ROA 0.239*** 4.822*** -0.446*** 3.194*** 0.693*** 0.753*** 3.963*** 
 (0.045) (0.200) (0.131) (0.184) (0.226) (0.254) (0.263) 
Share return 0.008 0.532*** 0.044*** 0.270*** 0.139*** -0.018 0.333*** 
 (0.005) (0.026) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) 
Log (Firm risk) -0.034*** -0.199*** -0.084*** -0.383*** -0.280*** -0.081** -0.174*** 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.019) (0.032) (0.038) (0.040) (0.045) 
Market-to-book -0.005 0.032** -0.007 -0.046*** -0.110*** 0.098*** 0.693*** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) 
Leverage -0.041 -0.861*** -0.089 0.116 -0.110 -0.306* -1.213*** 
 (0.026) (0.122) (0.075) (0.113) (0.142) (0.160) (0.174) 
CAPEX 0.004 -0.664** -0.049 -0.176 0.879** 0.145 1.509*** 
 (0.072) (0.362) (0.214) (0.326) (0.390) (0.471) (0.532) 
R&D 0.203 0.487 0.911* 1.906*** 1.418* -0.709 -4.720*** 
 (0.162) (0.746) (0.489) (0.638) (0.841) (1.037) (1.212) 
Cash -0.012 0.517*** 0.347*** 0.145 -0.122 -0.016 0.640*** 
 (0.033) (0.154) (0.095) (0.141) (0.177) (0.202) (0.234) 
        
Adjusted R2 0.5716 0.5330 0.5384 0.5530 0.4530 0.3881 0.2605 
Observations  51,843 51,843 51,788 51,843 51,808 51,515 51,785 
NOTES: OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log of the value for salary, and the natural log of one plus the variable 
value for other variables. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, and occupational title dummies are included in every regression but not 
reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
REGRESSION OF BONUS ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS AND PERFORMANCE  
 Dependent variable 
 Log (Bonus) 
Sample All All ROA< median ROA=> median 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.425 0.503 0.004 0.091 
 (0.429) (0.430) (0.678) (0.562) 
African American -0.134 0.047 -0.066 -0.630*** 
 (0.118) (0.135) (0.153) (0.138) 
Asian -0.070 -0.040 -0.158 0.139 
 (0.100) (0.119) (0.138) (0.119) 
Hispanic -0.152 -0.037 -0.076 -0.017 
 (0.142) (0.157) (0.186) (0.138) 
Female -0.037 -0.006 -0.187** -0.051 
 (0.068) (0.075) (0.083) (0.079) 
ROA 4.229***  4.024*** 3.646*** 
 (0.761)  (0.310) (0.508) 
African American * ROA -3.877***    
 (1.269)    
Asian * ROA 0.939    
 (0.735)    
Hispanic * ROA 2.114    
 (1.407)    
Female * ROA -1.290*    
 (0.667)    
ROA ≥ median  5.594***   
  (0.803)   
ROA < median  2.955**   
  (1.288)   
African American * ROA ≥ median  -7.847***   
  (1.900)   
African American * ROA < median  -0.242   
  (1.563)   
Asian * ROA ≥ median  0.528   
  (1.195)   
Asian * ROA < median  1.561   
  (1.071)   
Hispanic * ROA ≥ median  0.163   
  (1.757)   
Hispanic * ROA < median  5.616**   
  (2.567)   
Female * ROA ≥ median  -1.951**   
  (0.887)   
Female * ROA < median  -0.445   
  (1.001)   
     
Adjusted R2 0.5335 0.5341 0.5071 0.6073 
Observations  51,843 51,843 25,913 25,930 
NOTES: OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the bonus. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, occupational 
title dummies, and the variables age, age2, tenure, communications, HR or legal, log (sales), share return, log (firm risk), market-to-book, 
leverage, CAPEX, R&D, and cash are included in all regressions but not reported. Column 1 also includes the interaction of ROA with 
the occupational title dummies and the communications, HR or legal dummy variable. In column 2, ROA ≥ median is set equal to ROA 
if the ROA is equal to or greater than the median ROA of 4.68 percent. ROA < median is set equal to ROA if the ROA is less than the 
median ROA of 4.68 percent. Column 2 also includes the interaction of ROA ≥ median and ROA < median with the occupational title 
dummies and the communications, HR or legal dummy variable. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively.   
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TABLE 8 
REGRESSION OF OPTION HOLDING AND OPTION GAINS ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS 
 Dependent Variable 
 Log (Option holding) Log (Option gain) 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
Constant -9.274*** -5.976*** 
 (0.540) (0.623) 
African American -0.413*** -0.121 
 (0.131) (0.172) 
Asian 0.045 -0.219 
 (0.114) (0.139) 
Hispanic -0.043 -0.479*** 
 (0.138) (0.177) 
Female -0.400*** -0.042 
 (0.075) (0.095) 
Age 0.229*** 0.067*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) 
Age2 -0.002*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.020*** 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Communications, HR or legal -0.281*** -0.052 
 (0.093) (0.119) 
Log (Sales) 0.607*** 0.443*** 
 (0.036) (0.044) 
ROA 6.226*** 1.953*** 
 (0.245) (0.274) 
Share return 1.451*** 0.666*** 
 (0.032) (0.039) 
Log (Firm risk) -0.605*** 0.055 
 (0.039) (0.046) 
Market-to-book 0.447*** 0.504*** 
 (0.021) (0.026) 
Leverage -0.691*** -1.043*** 
 (0.150) (0.178) 
CAPEX 1.844*** -1.277** 
 (0.460) (0.544) 
R&D 0.950 -5.605*** 
 (0.985) (1.256) 
Cash 0.312 0.557** 
 (0.192) (0.236) 
Log (Option holding t-1)  0.387*** 
  (0.005) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.5039 0.3314 
Observations  51,792 46,392 
NOTES: In column 1 the dependent variable is the natural log of one plus the option holding. In column 2 the dependent variable is the natural 
log of one plus the option gain. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, and occupational title dummies are included in every regression but not 
reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels 
respectively.     
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 TABLE 9 
REGRESSION OF EQUITY INCENTIVES AND COMPENSATION ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS 
 Dependent variable 
 Log (Stock and option 
holding) 
Log (Salary and bonus) Log (Total pay) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.767*** 1.739*** 3.446*** 3.445*** 2.970*** 2.968*** 
 (0.305) (0.304) (0.119) (0.119) (0.144) (0.144) 
Ethnic minority  -0.071*  -0.018  0.014  
 (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.020)  
African American  -0.400***  -0.091***  -0.086*** 
  (0.074)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
Asian  0.154***  -0.012  0.023 
  (0.054)  (0.024)  (0.033) 
Hispanic  -0.094  0.043  0.097*** 
  (0.064)  (0.027)  (0.033) 
Female -0.185*** -0.189*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age 0.016* 0.017* 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Communications, HR or legal -0.287*** -0.271*** -0.088*** -0.085*** -0.131*** -0.127*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log (Sales) 0.418*** 0.419*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
ROA 2.979*** 2.971*** 0.785*** 0.785*** 0.555*** 0.555*** 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.051) (0.051) (0.069) (0.069) 
Share return 0.523*** 0.524*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log (Firm risk) -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Market-to-book 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.005 0.005 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage -0.285*** -0.288*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.215*** -0.216*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) 
CAPEX 2.222*** 2.221*** -0.111 -0.112 0.184 0.182 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.086) (0.086) (0.115) (0.115) 
R&D -2.643*** -2.677*** 0.074 0.068 -0.875*** -0.884*** 
 (0.527) (0.525) (0.197) (0.197) (0.297) (0.297) 
Cash 0.157 0.154 0.068* 0.067 0.170*** 0.169*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.041) (0.041) (0.054) (0.054) 
Log (Stock and option holding t-1)    0.016*** 0.016*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.6312 0.6316 0.6350 0.6351 0.6784 0.6785 
Observations  49,842 49,842 44,449 44,449 44,258 44,258 
NOTES: OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log of the variable value. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, and 
occupational title dummies are included in every regression but not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
REGRESSION OF COMPENSATION ON ETHNIC MINORITY STATUS: THE EFFECT OF ETHNIC MINORITY AND 
AFRICAN AMERICAN PRESENCE ON THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE  
 Dependent variable 
 Log (Salary and bonus) Log (Total pay) Log (Total ex-post pay) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 3.969*** 3.969*** 3.861*** 3.855*** 1.502*** 1.503*** 
 (0.266) (0.266) (0.353) (0.353) (0.407) (0.407) 
African American -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.168*** -0.161*** -0.214*** -0.192*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.056) (0.050) (0.067) (0.060) 
Asian -0.026 -0.026 -0.009 0.010 0.027 0.026 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.062) (0.053) (0.062) (0.057) 
Hispanic -0.011 -0.011 0.035 0.016 -0.081 -0.086 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046) (0.063) (0.060) 
Ethnic minority on compensation committee -0.002  -0.011  -0.026  
 (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.022)  
Ethnic minority on compensation committee * African American 0.080  0.044  0.048  
 (0.053)  (0.073)  (0.088)  
Ethnic minority on compensation committee * Asian -0.044  0.021  0.037  
 (0.061)  (0.088)  (0.093)  
Ethnic minority on compensation committee * Hispanic -0.026  -0.051  0.027  
 (0.070)  (0.075)  (0.098)  
African American on compensation committee  -0.002  -0.019  -0.031 
  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
African American on compensation committee * African American  0.080  0.039  -0.010 
  (0.053)  (0.071)  (0.087) 
African American on compensation committee * Asian  -0.044  -0.047  0.076 
  (0.061)  (0.093)  (0.109) 
African American on compensation committee * Hispanic  -0.026  0.000  0.049 
  (0.070)  (0.077)  (0.102) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.6956 0.6956 0.7011 0.7011 0.6236 0.6236 
Observations  12,289 12,289 12,235 12,235 12,281 12,281 
NOTES: OLS regression where the dependent variable is the natural log of the variable value. Firm fixed effects, year dummies, occupational 
title dummies, and the variables female, age, age2, tenure, communications, HR or legal, log (sales), share return, log (firm risk), market-
to-book, leverage, CAPEX, R&D, and cash are included in all regressions but not reported. The sample employed is all observations for 
which the executive is not the CEO or executive chair. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels respectively. 
 
